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SASKATCHEWAN

LAW REVIEW

"Valour Rather Than Prudence":
Hard Times and Hard Choices for
Canada's Legal Academy
Harry Arthurs*

One ought to celebrate the centennial of the University of
Saskatchewan's College of Law by recalling its past successes and
predicting its future achievements. However, many of those successes
did not come easily, either to Saskatchewan or to other Canadian law
faculties, nor can we be sure that the legal academy's trajectory of
progress, once established, will continue indefinitely. In many
respects, this might appear to be a golden moment for Canadian legal
education and scholarship: there are more law faculties, professors and
law students than ever before; extensive and successful experiments
in pedagogy and curriculum design have been proliferating across the
country; the quality (and diversity) of students entering law schools,
and of the faculty welcoming them, has never been higher; and the
extent, variety, ambition, and influence of legal scholarship in 2012
could hardly have been imagined a generation or two ago, let alone
when the College of Law was founded in 1912. Nonetheless, these are
hard times for Canadian law faculties. Their current successes are
threatened by an economic crisis that is choking off much-needed
resources, by the reassertion of professional control over legal education,
and by the revival of legal fundamentalism. I argue that to deflect
these threats and to continue to progress, law faculties must be willing
to adopt a more aggressive and more valorous stance vis-A-vis their
relevant others than they have done in the recent past.
I. THE LAW SCHOOL AND ITS "RELEVANT OTHERS"

In 1923, after a decade-long but relatively low-keyed controversy, the
Law Society of Saskatchewan abandoned attempts to educate wouldUniversity Professor Emeritus and President Emeritus, York University. This essay
was first presented as a contribution to the Future of Law Conference in honour
of the centenary of the College of Law, University of Saskatchewan. I am grateful
to Constance Backhouse and Roderick Macdonald, and to conference participants,
for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I also acknowledge the able
research and editorial assistance of Scott Byers (D Sask, 2011).
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be lawyers and conceded the right of the province's university to
establish a law school, to set its curriculum and academic standards,
and to determine the credentials of its faculty. The university won
the day (according to its president) by exhibiting "prudence rather
than valor."I Some thirty-five years later, in 1957, after a decade-long
controversy in which valour sometimes took precedence over
prudence, 2 Ontario's universities finally prevailed on the Law Society
of Upper Canada to follow the lead of Saskatchewan (and most other
provinces) by accepting university-based legal education as the only
route to professional practice and by conceding the right of law
faculties to design their own academic standards and programs.3
Moreover, as in Saskatchewan, but almost half a century later,
Ontario's Law Society ceased to operate its own law school. 4 Then, in
the 1970s and 1980s, it gradually abandoned its active surveillance of
developments in legal academe and by the end of the century, it
allowed its regulatory authority over academic legal education-the
provenance and extent of which was unclear-to fall into disuse. 5
Of course, the profession remained a significant contributor to
the shaping of legal education in Saskatchewan, Ontario, and elsewhere.
The form and content of articling and/or bar admission programs
1
2

Beth Bilson, "'Prudence Rather than Valor': Legal Education in Saskatchewan
1908-23" (1998) 61 Sask L Rev 341.
C Ian Kyer &Jerome EBickenbach, The FiercestDebate: Cecil A Wright, the Benchers,
and Legal Education in Ontario 1923-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1987).

3

4
5

I have focused on Saskatchewan because it is legal education in this province we
are celebrating, and Ontario, because it is the largest province, because-as a net
importer of law graduates-its admission requirements tended to influence the
development of law faculties outside Ontario, and because I know it best.
However, as the literature reminds us, relations between the profession's governing
bodies and university law faculties varied considerably over time and from
province to province. See e.g. W Wesley Pue, Law School: The Story of Legal
Education in British Columbia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Faculty
of Law, 1995) ch 3-5; Peter M Sibenik, "Doorkeepers: Legal Education in the
Territories and Alberta, 1885-1928" (1990) 13 Dal U 419 at 457-62; John M Law
& RoderickJ Wood, "A History of the Law Faculty" (1996) 35 Alta L Rev 1 at 8-15;
Dale Gibson & Lee Gibson, SubstantialJustice: Law and Lawyers in Manitoba 16701970 (Winnipeg: Peguis Publishers, 1972); W Wesley Pue, "Common Law Legal
Education in Canada's Age of Light, Soap and Water" (1996) 23 Man L 654 at 66574; GA McAllister, "Some Phases of Legal Education in New Brunswick" (1955) 8
UNBLJ 33; John Willis, A History of Dalhousie Law School (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1979).
HW Arthurs, "The Affiliation of Osgoode Hall Law School with York University"
(1967) 17 UTLJ 194.
See Harry W Arthurs, "The Tree of Knowledge/The Axe of Power: Gerald Le Dain
and the Transformation of Canadian Legal Education" in G Blaine Baker, ed,
Melanges Gerald Eric Le Dain: Tracings of a Life (Ottawa: Supreme Court Historical
Society, Forthcoming).
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established by the governing bodies influenced the courses that law
faculties chose to teach and students chose to study. 6 The profession's
citizenship and residency requirements for admission to practice
regulated the flow of law students across national and provincial
borders. 7 Furthermore, its "unauthorized practice" and professional
conduct regulations effectively defined the prospects for clinical legal
education. 8 But far more important than these occasional regulatory
interventions was the profession's informal influence over the culture of
legal education: the images of the legal system and the profession that
judges and lawyers conveyed in classroom lectures and commencement
speeches; 9 the signals that law firm interviewers sent to students
seeking employment; the financial and psychic rewards that "real"
lawyers bestowed on (or withheld from) their professorial counterparts;1 0
and the reforms in law and the legal system advocated by academics
and resisted by lawyers (or occasionally vice versa).
Most importantly, the profession continued to be regarded by
the legal academy itself as its "relevant other." The mandate, the very
raison d'etre of law faculties, as it was generally understood, was to
produce well-trained recruits for the legal profession. Practitioners were
often invited to serve as part-time instructors, and in many faculties
taught a significant proportion of the courses. The professional
nexus was used by law deans to justify preferred treatment by their
university administration on matters ranging from library holdings,
to faculty recruitment, to instructional costs. Success in placing their
graduates as judicial clerks or having them hired by leading law firms
became the metric by which a faculty's reputation would be measured
and, in recent years especially, law faculties have made strenuous efforts
6

HW Arthurs, "The Political Economy of Canadian Legal Education" (1998) 25 JL
& Soc'y 14; Annie Rochette & W Wesley Pue, "Back to Basics? University Legal
Education and 21st Century Professionalism" (2001) 20 Windsor YB Access Just 167.
7 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [19891 1 SCR 143, 56 DLR (4th) 1;
Federation of Law Societies Inter-jurisdictional Mobility Task Force, A Framework
for National Mobility (Ottawa: Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 2002).
8
For an account of regulatory tensions surrounding Ontario's first law school
clinical program see Frederick H Zemans, "The Dream Is Still Alive: Twenty-Five
Years of Parkdale Community Legal Services and the Osgoode Hall Law School
Intensive Program in Poverty Law" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L 499 at 512-521. For
relative standard provisions defining the practice of law see e.g. Law Society Act,
RSO 1990, c L.8, s 26.1; Legal Profession Act, 1990, SS 1990-91, c L-10.1, ss 30-32;
Legal Profession Act, RSA 2000, c L-8, ss 106-107; Legal ProfessionAct, RSBC 1998,
c 9, s 15.
9 Michel Bastarache, "The Role of Academics and Legal Theory in Judicial DecisionMaking" (1999) 37 Alta L Rev 739; Allan Hutchinson, "The Role of Judges in Legal
Theory and The Role of Legal Theorists in Judging (or 'Don't Let the Bastaraches
Grind You Down')" (2001) 39 Alta L Rev 657.
10 Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2005) at 321-322.
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to cultivate their alumni in order to win their goodwill and financial
support. In such an environment, it is no wonder that professional
influence over legal education has remained dominant-even without
formal professional participation in the governance or oversight of
the academic enterprise.
However, the profession's influence did not go unchallenged. The
practising bar may have been the "relevant other" of the legal academy,
but it was the "other" nonetheless. For most law professors, practice
was the road not taken. Their graduate school experience enabled
them to think about law in ways that practitioners were unlikely to,
the rhythm of their lives gave them time to do so, and their own life
choices tended to predispose them to challenge, not reproduce or
reinforce, conventional legal wisdom.
In the legal academy of the 1940s and 1950s, these challenges
might have passed relatively unnoticed. As late as 1960, there were
less than a hundred full-time law teachers in all of Canada-too
few to make their influence felt.1 1 However during the 1960s, as
universities and their law faculties expanded exponentially, the
number of law teachers also grew rapidly-to three or four hundred
by the end of the decade. Moreover, this growth occurred at an historic
moment when professional, political, academic, and other elites
were being discredited, when traditional ideas about law and about
education were being challenged, and thus when law faculties were
coming to be perceived as sites of contestation and engines of social
transformation. In the result, Canadian legal academe at the end of
the 1960s was very different both quantitatively and qualitatively
from what it had been ten years earlier. Of course, not all law schools
changed to the same extent, or in the same way, but it could generally
be said that by the 1970s and 1980s most had begun to acknowledge
a second "relevant other"-the university-whose influence counterbalanced that of the first. 12
11

12

However, even within the very tiny cohort of Canadian law teachers prior to the
1960s, there were individuals whose intellectual interests and connections
extended far beyond law. See e.g. Sandra Djwa, The Politics of the Imagination: A
Life of F.R. Scott (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987); RCB Risk, "The Many
Minds of W.P.M. Kennedy" (1998) 48 UTLJ 353. For a general survey of early
Canadian legal scholars and scholarship, see RCB Risk, A History of CanadianLegal
Thought: Collected Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006).
Mission statements contained in student handbooks or on websites provide some
indication of how law schools wish themselves to be regarded. For example,
Osgoode/York believes its mission is "to contribute to new knowledge about
the law and the legal system by being a centre for thoughtful and creative legal
scholarship, to provide an outstanding professional and liberal education to our
students so that they can assume positions of leadership in the legal profession,
among legal academics and in all aspects of public life, and to serve Canadian
society and the world in ways that further social justice." (Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, "About York University and Osgoode Hall Law School",
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The stock-in-trade of the contemporary university is scholarship.
Academics are expected not merely to disseminate information through
teaching, but to generate and critically evaluate ideas through
scholarly research and publication. Universities therefore came to expect
that their law faculties would do more than supply the profession
with technically competent recruits, and that law professors would
engage seriously in original scholarship. Many law professors eagerly
embraced this new expectation and began to define themselves as
scholars. At first, they focussed on analysing, interpreting, and
evaluating legal concepts, processes, and institutions. This filled a
considerable gap in Canadian legal scholarship, where as late as the
1970s and 1980s, no standard text or authoritative treatise existed in
many fields of law.
Over time, however, legal academics began to produce scholarship
that diverged considerably from the intellectual agenda and discursive
conventions of the practising bar. This divergence can be explained
in several ways. In part it was a belated acknowledgment of the
multiple roles played by law as a regulatory, mediative, and tutelary
institution in complex and dynamic modern societies; in part it
stemmed from a growing conviction that lawyers had historically
disserved their traditional clientele by underestimating or misconceiving
what they needed to know in order to practice competently; in part
it was an attempt to meet the diverse needs of law graduates who
were increasingly specializing within private practice or moving out
of practice into alternative careers in the public or private sector; in
online: Osgoode Hall Law School and York University <http://www.osgoodepd.cal
about York Osgoode.html>. UBC law faculty, which aspires "to be one of the world's
great centres for legal education and research" promises to "[p]rovide an exceptional
and inspiring legal education that enables students to excel in professional practice
and serving society [and to]... [e]ngage in research that produces outstanding scholarship
with local, national and global impact...." See University of British Columbia, "UBC
Law Strategic Plan", online: University of British Columbia <http://www.law.ubc.ca/
strategic-plan/vision.html>. Alberta is committed to "...provide service to the
community, to educate prospective lawyers and others seeking a thorough understanding of the law and the legal system, and to promote the acquisition of legal
knowledge and the advancement of legal scholarship...." See University of Alberta
Faculty of Law, "Law Faculty Council Policy Manual", online: University of Alberta
<http://lawschool.ualberta.ca/students/current/-/mediallaw/facultystaff/administration/
documents/LFCPolicyManual-CurrentasofJulyl52009.pdf>. Toronto takes pride in
its "core values and traditions of scholarly excellence, societal relevance, institutional
leadership and risk-taking." See University of Toronto Faculty of Law, "Brief History
of the Law School," online: University of Toronto <http://www.law.utoronto.ca/
about/brief-history>. Schulich/Dalhousie, somewhat more modestly, offers its
students "a solid preparation for the practice of law.. .and encourages respect for
and participation in public life." See Dalhousie University Faculty of Law, online:
Dalhousie University <http://dlm.cal.dal.calLAWS.htm>. Saskatchewan's College
of Law apparently does not publish a mission statement.
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part it was fuelled by the understandable desire of legal scholars to
benefit from insights developed in adjacent disciplines; and in part it
flowed naturally from the fact that academics had consciously chosen
not to practice, precisely so that they would be free to engage with
law and legal ideas in unconventional ways.
Whatever the explanation, the legal academy now had two
"relevant others" whose demands and expectations differed considerably.
This in turn had a number of important consequences. First, debates
ensued over the allocation of the limited resources available to law
faculties. For instance, time spent on research could not be spent on
teaching; time spent on instruction in "the basics" could not be spent
on developing students' broader understanding of what law is and does;
and time spent producing systemic critique and interdisciplinary
scholarship could not be spent on the publication of treatises and casenotes. Second, these debates affected not only resource allocationteaching loads and library budgets, for example-but whom law
faculties hired and, to an extent, whom they attracted and admitted
as students. Where a law school chose (or was forced) to position
itself in relation to its two "relevant others," how it chose to allocate
resources, determined how it would be perceived by those others, as
well as by potential student and faculty recruits. Third, since perception
did not always correspond to reality, and reality did not always
conform to aspiration, law schools began to consciously adopt
distinctive personalities by developing new mission statements,
admissions procedures, courses and curricula, pedagogic strategies,
research institutes, programs of outreach to the bar and the community,
and joint degree and graduate programs. Finally, these developments
required that law schools engage more intimately and extensively
with the university and the profession-on both of which they
depended for resources, influence, and legitimation. But when these
were provided by one of the two "relevant others," they revealed
the schizophrenic character of the legal academy: they were often
proffered for different reasons and on different terms, directed to
different projects, and designed to advance different visions of legal
scholarship and education.
I have both overstated and understated the tension between the
two major influences playing on the legal academy. On the one
hand, most law schools managed to maintain positive relationships
with both the profession and the university, to achieve acceptable
compromises in resource allocation, to cultivate multiple personae,
and to serve multiple interests. So too did many law teachers, though
some outliers felt isolated and resentful. As a result, it can fairly be
said that by the twenty-first century, Canadian law faculties had
become more scholarly than ever and more effective in training their
graduates for the varied and volatile careers that awaited them. On
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the other hand, to some extent they maintained their multiple
personalities by avoiding hard choices. Alas, hard times make
hard choices unavoidable-and these are hard times for Canadian
universities and lawyers and, consequently, for the legal academy.
H1. HARD TIMES FOR THE LEGAL ACADEMY
A. THE ECONOMY

The current world-wide recession, which shows little sign of abating,
is having an obvious effect on the legal academy's two "relevant
others." Universities are affected by cutbacks in government grants;
money for research is in short supply and competition for what
remains is distorted by policies that prioritize funding for "practical"
subject areas or projects that attract matching funds from private
sources; costs of instruction will ultimately have to be contained by
expanding class sizes and/or curtailing labour-intensive pedagogies;
faculty salaries and working conditions are likely to deteriorate; and
students and their families, despite enhanced bursary and scholarship
programs, will be increasingly hard-pressed to pay rising tuition costs.
The legal profession is also in difficulty. Unfavourable business
conditions always affect lawyers, whether they serve middle and
working class clients or governments and large businesses. The
"hollowing out" of the Canadian economy-with fewer and fewer
head offices-has led to the restructuring of its legal profession, as
fewer large firms compete for a shrinking number of corporate clients.
Competition from new sources-ranging from self-help online services
to foreign law firms to paralegals to in-house law departments to
offshore "back of house" providers of routine legal services-threatens
the long-term economic prospects of many conventional legal practices.
At the same time, the number of applicants for admission to Canada's
legal professions has been growing steadily, including a significant
cohort of graduates of foreign law schools, members of foreign law
firms, and soon, graduates from newly-established law faculties in
Ontario and British Columbia. Law faculties will feel the effects of
these developments in various ways. Some of the effects are directly
related to financial factors. As rising numbers of law graduates are
unable to find articling positions or entry-level professional jobs,
students will be less and less likely to enrol in legal academic programs
as these programs will be seen to be professionally negotiable. In
addition, as the economic prospects of the bar deteriorate, lawyers
will be less and less willing or able to contribute the funds needed to
replace dwindling government grants.
But more importantly, the economic crisis is likely to influence
the intellectual ethos of legal education and scholarship. From the
1940s through the 1970s, Canada's buoyant economy supported the
expansion of the welfare state and engendered an optimistic,
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reformist view of law's potential to advance social justice. But "the
economy is the secret police of our desires." 13 In times of economic
crisis especially, governments of all political stripes tend to focus on
cutting expenditures rather than launching costly projects of social
engineering. Recurring crises over the past three or four decades
have not only led to significant reductions in law reform budgets, in
funding for legal aid clinics, and in support for advocacy groups-all
of which inspired both legal scholarship and student career choicesbut have also helped to "normalize" a minimalist view of state action
and to entrench pessimism, even cynicism, about the potential of law
as a strategy for social reform. On the one hand, the advent of the
Charter1 4 may to some extent have masked or retarded the onset of
this new "neo-liberal normal." On the other hand, perhaps the onset
of the "neo-liberal normal" explains why so many social movements
faut de mieux turned to the Charterto advance their cause. However, I
would argue, even in the Charterera expectations of what law should
and can do to improve the lot of ordinary citizens have diminished
considerably. And to make a more general point: the economy to a
significant extent determines the political content of what at any
given time legal scholars write, law students learn, lawyers assume,
judges pronounce, and legislators decree about the legal system. Hard
times in the economy are therefore likely to provoke painful revision
of the progressive view of law in which the intellectual DNA of the
Canadian legal academy has long been secreted. 1 5
B. PROFESSIONAL CONTROL OVER LEGAL EDUCATION

Predictably, "hard times" have triggered not only economic but
also political difficulties for law faculties. In particular, they have
revived a long-dormant conflict over the profession's control of legal
education. In Saskatchewan in 1923 and in Ontario in 1957, to cite
two examples, this conflict was resolved by the development of
formal, quasi-constitutional understandings about the respective
responsibilities and powers of law faculties and law societies. But even
more important than such formal arrangements was a ditente that
developed in the decades following 1960 between the academy and the
profession. Apart from occasional intemperate outbursts of o tempora,
13
14
15

Graffiti observed in Swiss Cottage, London, in 1985.
CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
Harry Arthurs, "The State We're In: Legal Education in Canada's New Political
Economy" (2001) 20 Windsor YB Access Just 35; Susan Boyd, "Corporatism and
Legal Education in Canada" (2005) 14 Soc & Leg Stud 287; Theresa Shanahan,
"Creeping Capitalism and Academic Culture at a Canadian Law School" (2008) 26
Windsor YB Access Just 121; Margaret Thornton, "The Law School, the Market and
the New Knowledge Economy" (2007) 17 Legal Educ Rev 1.
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o mores at bar association and law society meetings, the profession
seldom contested the academy's primacy in the design and delivery
of legal education. 16 Therefore, the academy had no reason to challenge
the profession's policies relating to admission to practice.
This arrangement between the legal profession and the legal
academy was mutually beneficial. The law schools helped the profession
in many ways: LLB/JD programs produced numbers of well-trained
graduates with the capacity to adapt to the diverse new career profiles
of the profession; graduate and continuing education programs
allowed practitioners to maintain or enhance their intellectual capital;
legal scholars produced indispensable standard reference works and
useful research for projects of law reform; and equitable law school
admissions policies slowly modified the profession's once indefensible
demographics. And the profession in turn helped the law schools: law
firms sponsored academic prizes, bursaries, internships, lecture series,
professorships, and new facilities; and practitioners taught courses
and gave guest lectures. More importantly, though, the profession
legitimated the whole project of academic law by accepting law
professors in senior government positions, on the bench, and in
professional organizations, by consulting them on complex files and
citing their publications, and by using student grades and professorial
recommendations as the primary metric when hiring articling students
and junior associates.
However, this mutually beneficial ditente ended abruptly in 2009,
when the Federation of Law Societies of Canada (FLSC) and its
member bodies adopted the recommendations of its Task Force on
the Canadian Common Law Degree. 17 The Task Force was originally
mandated to address three contentious issues: the admission to
practice of law graduates from abroad; the establishment of new
Canadian law schools; and the risk that the profession's exercise of its
power to control admission to practice might violate the
Competition Act. However, the Task Force chose instead to focus
primarily on the curricula of existing Canadian law schools. This was
a political event of great significance. For the first time in the recent
history of Canadian legal education, the profession's governing
bodies were formally asserting their claim to be entitled to tell law
schools what they must teach, to whom, and to some extent, how.
16

17

There was one notorious exception: see Robert Bureau & Carol Jobin, "Les
Sciences Juridiques AL'Universit6 du Quebec AMontreal: Fifteen Years Later"
(1987) 11 Dalhousie L 295.
Task Force on the Canadian Common Law Degree, Final Report (Ottawa:
Federation of Law Societies of Canada, October 2009), online: Federation of Law
Societies of Canada <http://www.flsc.ca/ documents/Common-Law-DegreeReport-C(1).pdf> [Task Force]. I provide a detailed account of these developments
in Arthurs, supra note 5.

82

Saskatchewan Law Review 2013 Vol. 76

Whether law societies, with their limited statutory powers, have such
a right is dubious. Also dubious is their ability to disregard university
governance statutes that assign university senates and boards the
right to determine law school curricula, admission standards,
instructional methods, and resource allocation. But whatever the
legal rights and wrongs, the Federation should clearly not have
established a task force unilaterally, nor should the provincial law
societies have adopted its recommendations without formally consulting
law faculties and university governing bodies. By acting unilaterally,
the Federation and the law societies effectively repudiated the "unwritten
constitution" that had governed political relations between law
schools and the profession's governing bodies for the past fifty years.
Under the former dispensation, as the Task Force report itself
acknowledged, law societies pretended to regulate, and law faculties
pretended to comply.' 8 No longer. Law schools that do not comply
with the new requirements will not be "approved" and their graduates
will not qualify for automatic entry to the bar admission process in
any province. To ensure compliance, each law dean must now certify
that his or her faculty conforms to the new requirements and
describe in detail how the faculty's regulations and programs ensure
that every graduating student has been instructed in accordance
with those requirements. The implications for legal education and
scholarship will be far-reaching. Law schools that do not already
conform to the requirements must either acquire new resources or
redeploy existing -resources in order to do so-a difficult decision
indeed in hard times. The imposition of common curriculum and
admissions standards will affect the ability of law faculties to adopt or
maintain equity admissions programs, specialized curriculum streams
or unconventional pedagogic strategies. Worse yet, the requirement
for annual reapproval will exercise a chilling effect on future
innovation. As time goes on, the list of required courses will almost
certainly grow; surveillance to ensure compliance will almost certainly
become more intrusive; and the willingness or ability of universities
and law faculties to resist will be greatly weakened as their initial
acquiescence comes to be construed as an acknowledgement that this
is the way things are, always have been, and must therefore always
be.
Not only the modus operandi of the Federation's Task Force, but also
the wording of its report make it clear that all of these consequences
were clearly contemplated. So too does the refusal of the Task Force
to even mention, let alone recommend, a proposal that it should
adopt a set of constitutional principles to protect fundamental academic
values, ensure academic participation in the implementation and
18

Ibid at 16-18.

Hard Times and Hard Choices for Canada's Legal Academy 83

revision of the new standards and acknowledge the effect of the new
dispensation on resource allocation within law faculties. 19 In short, the
political dynamic of Canadian legal education has been transformed
by the bar's naked assertion of power and by the decision of the legal
academy to opt for prudence rather than valour. 2 0
C. THE RETURN OF LEGAL FUNDAMENTALISM

I have not completed my catalogue of the hard times confronting our
law schools. Perhaps the most serious of all is the return of what
might be called "legal fundamentalism."
For a century or more, legal scholars (and some thoughtful
practitioners and judges) have one way or another insisted upon
the indeterminacy of legal decisions, the historical contingency of
legal institutions and processes, and the cultural variability of what
people understand "law" to be. There is, of course, no manifesto to
which all Canadian law faculties or professors members subscribe.
The only attempt to write one, in the early 1980s, provoked more
controversy than concurrence. 2 1 Nonetheless, I maintain, in the
1960s the legal academy began tentatively to explore a series of what
I will describe (for want of a better descriptor) as "anti-fundamentalist"
propositions. The legal academy embraced these propositions with
some enthusiasm in the 1970s and 1980s, and by the 1990s it had
begun to translate them into discursive conventions (what we teach
and write and how) and institutional practices (how we organize
collective activity and present ourselves to our various publics).
Today, while anti-fundamentalism is far from universal, it finds at
least tacit expression in the mission statements, curriculum reports
and academic programs of most law faculties and in the CVs and course
syllabi of many individual law professors. Its underlying assumptions,
and their implications, can be captured in a series of syllogisms:
Substantive legal knowledge is inherently indeterminate, has a short
shelf life, and is used (if at all) in unpredictable combinations by
lawyers in various kinds of practices. The study of particular
19
20

21

See Annie Rochette, "Introduction to the Special Issue on the Federation of Law
Societies Task Force on the Approved Law Degree" (2009) 3 Canadian Legal
Education Annual Review 135.
In addition to the two organizations of legal scholars in note 19, supra, several
university presidents, law deans and law faculty councils did register strong
objections when the Task Force circulated its draft proposals. However, no law
faculty or university has so far challenged the new regime by declaring its intention
not to comply or by seeking legal recourse against it.
Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Law and Learning,
(Ottawa: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, 1983). I was the
principal author of this report.
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subjects should therefore be regarded not so much as an end in
itself but rather as a vehicle for teaching law students how to
analyze and resolve legal problems.
No convincing argument or evidence demonstrates that any particular
area of substantive law is indispensablefor either students' intellectual
formation or lawyers' professional functions. Law schools should
therefore construct their curricula so as to afford students an
ample, arguably unlimited, choice of courses and seminars,
whose content and pedagogic strategy should be largely at the
instructors' discretion.
Many lawyers spend much of their time performing routineprocedures
that can be (and are) also performed by para-professionals and
support staff with no formal knowledge of the underlying legal rules
or principles. Law schools believe that, while students should be
made aware of these routine procedures in a general sense,
training in their use is best undertaken elsewhere.
Successful resolution of most problems encountered in legal practice
requires not only knowledge of substantive and adjectival law but
also an ability to negotiate the practicalitiesof the legal system, to
engage with the real-life circumstances of the parties and to take
account of the largersocial and economic circumstances within which
their interests are imbricated. Law students should therefore
learn not only to locate problems within their legal-systemic
and larger societal contexts, but also to work effectively with
non-legal actors to resolve them.
Law graduates not only provide conventional legal services to clients,
but also occupy leadership and technocratic roles in business,
government, politics and social movements. Law teachers should
therefore expose their students-many of whom will occupy
these roles-to insights from adjacent disciplines so that they
will better comprehend how law shapes and is shaped by social
and economic forces and cultural practices.
Law and legal practice have become increasingly complex, and are
changing at an increasing rate of speed. Law schools should
therefore educate law students to adapt to complexity and
change, and to embrace and promote change that is in the
public interest. Legal scholars should assist the profession and
the public by identifying the need for change, offering insights
into the best way to achieve it, documenting its effects, and
critically evaluating its consequences.
Academics, lawyers working on publicpolicy issues, as well as many
specialistpractitionersrequire greater breadth, depth and variety of
knowledge than is provided in basic JD courses. Law faculties
should therefore offer enriched or advanced JD programs,
graduate programs, and programs of continuing education.
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To acknowledge once again the limits of this description, while most
Canadian law faculties and individual professors subscribe to these
anti-fundamentalist propositions, they do so with varying degrees of
conviction, and actually act on their implications with varying
degrees of consistency. Still, it would be difficult to find a single law
faculty that opposes them on grounds of principle, or for that matter,
many individual law teachers who do so. 2 2
By contrast, legal fundamentalists tend to believe that "law"as a field of study, as a profession, as a social institution-has an
essential meaning, a core content, and distinctive institutional
characteristics that may change slowly over time but at any given
moment can be authoritatively specified. The criteria for specification
and the source of the authority to specify are not, for fundamentalists,
open to question: they are the constitutional and institutional
arrangements found on every conventional map or model of law.
Compelling evidence that constitutions change meaning and
institutions change functions over time seems not to disturb their
certainty; their own lived experience that statutes, regulations, judicial
decisions, and practical professional knowledge all have a limited
shelf-life seems not to alter their insistence on law's immutability.
Fundamentalists also believe that legal rules can and do shape human
and corporate conduct. However, they decline to acknowledge that
the rules themselves are often ambiguous, that they are interpreted
and applied by themselves and other human agents, that those
agents are susceptible to cultural, social, and economic influences,
and that legal rules are often circumnavigated or disregarded when
they run counter to the felt necessities of the time or the interests of
powerful clients. Finally, fundamentalists are dismissive of the idea
that law can be produced other than by formal institutions of the
state, in accordance with constitutionally mandated procedures. But
they remain oblivious to the undoubted power of non-state normative
systems that operate within, beyond and often in opposition to state
law-including normative systems they themselves construct as
public officials, as architects of the structures of private governance,
and as shapers of quotidian legal routines.
The report of the FLSC task force exemplifies this fundamentalist
approach. All law graduates are expected to demonstrate: (a) three
"skills competencies" (in problem solving, legal research, and oral and
written legal communication); 2 3 (b) "an awareness and understanding"
22
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of legal ethics and professionalism (in a course dedicated to that
subject); 2 4 and (c) a "general understanding of the foundations of
law" 25 (principles of common law and equity, statutory construction
and analysis, and the administration of justice), "of the core principles
of public law" 2 6 (constitutional law, including the Charter and the
rights of Aboriginal peoples; criminal law; and administrative law) and
"of the foundational legal principles that apply to private relationships"
(contracts, torts, property, and "legal and fiduciary concepts in
commercial relationships"). 2 7
I identify this approach as "fundamentalist" because the Task
Force treats its selection of these particular "competencies" and
"understandings" as res judicata, requiring no further explanation
than the fact that eminent and experienced lawyers have signed their
names to the report. But its selection is clearly both over- and underinclusive. For example, numeracy, inter-personal skills, and the
capacity to organize information are "competencies" almost all
lawyers must deploy, but law students will not be obliged to acquire
them. Another example: the "foundations of law" mysteriously do
not appear to include legal theory, legal history, or the sociology
of law. And one more example: students' "awareness" of "ethics and
professionalism" need not extend to the governance of the profession
or to the economic and social forces that tempt or compel its
members to transgress the rules of professional conduct. Worse
yet, no theoretical or practical rationale is provided for designating
certain substantive subjects as required and others as not. The Task
Force does not claim that most lawyers actually use the designated
fields of substantive knowledge in their practices; nor could it: almost
no one practices in all of the fields mentioned, very few practice
in some of them (such as criminal or constitutional law), and a great
many who practice in specialized fields require knowledge of substantive
subjects other than those specified (such as tax, employment, or
intellectual property law). It does not assert that lawyers must
understand the subjects identified because it will enable them to
adapt to the changes in law that will inevitably occur during their
careers. For example, no mention is made in the Task Force report of
international, comparative, or transnational law, which are likely to
become increasingly important given the globalization of Canada's
economy (nor, parenthetically, does the Task Force believe that "a
general understanding of the core legal concepts applicable to the
practice of law in Canada" 28 should extend to the concepts of civil
24 Ibid at Recommendation 4B 2.
25 Ibid at Recommendation 4B 3.1.
26 Ibid at Recommendation 4B 3.2.
27 bid at Recommendation 4B 3.3.
28 Ibid at Recommendation 4B 3.
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law). Nor does the Task Force justify its selection on the ground that
certain fields of substantive instruction have been given priority on
the basis of the public good or general welfare: for example, "legal
and fiduciary concepts in commercial relationships" 29 are required, but
similar concepts in family, professional or governmental relationships
are ignored.
In developing its list of requirements, then, the Task Force report
acknowledges the relevance of neither theory nor empirical evidence.
It therefore ignores the extent and rapidity of social, cultural, political,
and economic change which shortens the shelf life of much substantive
law and requires ongoing revision of the institutions and processes
through which law works. It ignores technology that is changing
access to legal information and the processing of legal transactions
and, therefore, the course of legal routines, the cost structure of legal
practices, the clientele that lawyers serve, and (for all of these reasons)
the competencies and substantive knowledge they must possess in
the future. It ignores the marked functional differentiation of roles
within the legal profession that requires specialists to narrow but
deepen their legal knowledge and general practitioners to broaden
theirs while embedding it in standard forms and structured routines
whose deployment does not entail costs that will price them out of
the markets they serve.
In short, by declining to look at evidence of how lawyers used to
practice, how they practice today, or how they are likely to practice
tomorrow, the Task Force has rejected evolution and, instead,
embraced the juridical equivalent of intelligent design. By prescribing
"competencies" and "understandings" to be dispensed by every law
school and acquired by every graduate, the Task Force has relied,
selectively as fundamentalists do, on text and exegesis to impose its
beliefs on non-believers and to stop the inexorable process of change
that is inherent in any community that generates and disseminates
ideas. By using coercive methods to ensure that new lawyers possess
stipulated knowledge, skills, and beliefs, without holding existing
practitioners to the same standard, the Task Force exhibits a degree of
hypocrisy not unknown in fundamentalist circles. Finally, by claiming
the right to insist that law faculties design their programs and allocate
their resources in accordance with the new requirements, regardless
of their governing statutes, the Task Force metaphorically ignores the
separation of church and state-of the profession and the academyas fundamentalists are wont to do.
Of course, the Federation of Law Societies is not alone in its
commitment to legal fundamentalism. On the contrary, it seems to
be following the lead of its American counterparts, which in recent
29
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years have developed an aggressive "competencies"-based strategy to
influence the content of law school curricula. 3 0 If the U.S. experience
is a guide to future developments in Canada, we can expect to see two
further developments.
The first development is the alignment of the legal academy into
pro- and anti-fundamentalist camps. In very general terms, non-elite
law schools in the United States have taken to disparaging their elite
counterparts for failing to equip graduates for the practice of law, for
offering too many courses and seminars that (in their view) lack
professional salience and exist only to indulge the specialized scholarly
interests of the professoriate, and for spending an undue proportion
of their ample resources on research. To some extent, elite schools
have responded not by altering their curricula or abandoning their
scholarly priorities but by enriching the student experience in various
ways. However, the non-elite schools appear to have developed a close
working alliance with the practising bar with a view to encouraging
state bar associations to adopt national admissions standards similar
to those promoted by the FLSC. As a likely by-product of such a
development, many law schools will feel obliged to "teach to the
test," to ensure that their curricula cover the subjects and deliver the
competencies specified in the national standards. Only elite schools
whose degrees demonstrably enhance the job prospects of their
graduates and their ultimate access to prestige, wealth, and power
will be able to resist this tendency. Further, because they will be
relatively impervious to developments elsewhere, elite schools are
unlikely to expend much effort in resisting fundamentalism.
While the elite/non-elite division amongst Canadian law schools
is much less sharp than in the United States, it is easy to imagine that
some law schools will tilt toward the fundamentalist position. Startup law schools seeking approval under the Federation's guidelines,
schools attempting to differentiate themselves from more prestigious
regional rivals, schools that depend heavily on support from their
local bar and community, schools that cannot afford-or do not
care-to invest heavily in research: any of these may be tempted to
define their mission and advertise their wares as training in lawyerly
"fundamentals" that will best equip graduates for professional practice.
A second likely development is that students themselves will
pressure law schools to adopt fundamentalist values and programs. In
the United States, this pressure has taken the form of several class
actions brought against lower-tier law schools by their disgruntled
30
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former students alleging that they were induced to study law by false
promises that they would have excellent prospects of professional
employment after graduation.3 1 While such lawsuits have not so far
succeeded in the United States, and are not likely to in Canada, students
have long used more conventional tactics to force law schools to
concentrate on what students (like the FRSC task force) describe as
"fundamentals"-"competencies" on the one hand, and "core" subjects
on the other. Students, for example, may "vote with their feet" (and
their fees) by seeking admission to the law schools they perceive to be
most closely aligned with the profession's vision of legal education. If
enrolled elsewhere, they may expend disproportionate amounts of
their time and energy on courses that carry the profession's imprimatur.
When they select from the menu of optional courses, they may shy
away from those, like legal history and philosophy, to which the
profession gives short shrift. When they evaluate their instructors, or
provide input to law school appointment or promotion committees,
they may disfavour professors who do not teach required courses or
purvey the "core" competencies. To the extent that student views
directly or indirectly influence resource allocation within the law
school, they may cause resources to be shifted from research, graduate
studies, and "esoteric" seminars to the teaching of "fundamentals",
and to career counselling and other student support services. Indeed,
some argue that these fundamentalist views are not only fostered by
the profession but are also in fact deeply embedded in the law student
culture. 32
III. VALOUR RATHER THAN PRUDENCE: PROTECTING THE
INTEGRITY OF THE LEGAL ACADEMY

In this concluding section of my essay, I propose a series of responses
to the three challenges to Canadian legal education that I have
identified. Because of the magnitude of these challenges and their
inter-related and ramifying effects, I contend that law faculties and
the professoriate will have to adopt a somewhat less prudent (not to
say passive) stance than they have in recent times and reassert the
bolder, more valorous positions that enabled them to make great
strides in the last three or four decades of the twentieth century.
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A. THE ECONOMY
Law schools have limited ability to either absorb or avoid the
reductions in government funding that over the long term will
adversely affect their ability to introduce new programs, experiment
with new pedagogic approaches, and intensify their research activities.
They cannot ask students to pay more because their economic
prospects are declining; they cannot appeal to traditional donors,
such as their alumni, many of whom are also feeling the effects of the
prolonged recession; and they can hardly expect universities to shift
resources from other harder-pressed faculties to law, which in most
institutions is relatively generously resourced. They therefore face
two choices, both of which they should have the courage to resist.
The first choice is to become more aggressively entrepreneurial:
to auction off their reputations and facilities; accept funds from any
source, no matter how inconsistent with the reformist inclinations
or intellectual priorities of its faculty members; and to move in the
direction of the "corporate university."3 3 The second choice is to opt
for asceticism: to abandon intensive but expensive forms of pedagogy
in favour of relatively cheap set-piece classroom lectures; to hire
more part-time practitioner-lecturers in order to save on full-time
professorial salaries; to turn from grant-supported empirical and
interdisciplinary scholarship to more traditional forms of scholarship
that can be performed inexpensively online or in the law library; and
to abandon international partnerships and participation in scholarly
conferences, in order to save travel costs.
How then to square the circle of rising costs and falling revenues?
Some increase in entrepreneurship and fundraising seems inevitable;
so too does the introduction of some element of restraint in professorial
salaries; so too does some form of "graduate tax" whereby alumni
who earn large salaries in practice volunteer (or are required by law)
to repay some significant part of the cost of the education that made
their success possible. But most of all, law faculties must learn to make
pragmatic but honourable compromises between entrepreneurship
and asceticism.
B. PROFESSIONAL CONTROL
The assertion of professional power, in the form of new requirements
for "approval" of law faculties, represents perhaps the most farreaching threat to legal education and scholarship. However, it also
represents the threat that, in a functional sense, is easiest to counter.
Law schools can simply say "no" to law societies. Faculties can design
curricula in accordance with their best academic judgment, not the
33
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profession's new requirements. Deans can decline to submit annual
statements attesting to their faculty's compliance. However, while
there are principled, practical and (I believe) legal reasons for
adopting this bold stance, it is a high risk strategy. If faculties and
deans "say no", their law schools will no longer be approved; and if
they are no longer approved, students will be less likely to apply to or
enrol in them.3 4 On the other hand, law societies cannot simply
refuse admission to graduates from law faculties that are not
approved. To the contrary: they will have to find a way to test those
graduates on an individual basis, rather than extending to their
degrees the autonomic recognition that is extended to graduates of
approved faculties. This, I suspect, is beyond the capacity of most law
societies.
Finally, by "saying no" law deans and faculties would force
governments to mediate an unpleasant (and unnecessary) dispute
between universities and law societies, both of which are ultimately
creatures of provincial legislation. Any one of a number of approaches
would resolve this conflict, but the most obvious would be to ensure
that the requirements for admission to practice are determined
bilaterally by the bar and the academy, rather than unilaterally by
the former. This, after all, is how similar disputes were resolved in
Saskatchewan in the 1920s,35 Ontario in the 1950s, 3 6 in the United
States, 3 7 and in some other professions such as medicine and
architecture (but not engineering).3 8 Whatever form new, bilateral
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institutional arrangements might take, decisions about how lawyers
should be qualified for practice must be understood to involve
extensive, principled and evidence-based discussions of what they
need to know, how best to ensure that they initially acquire and
frequently update that knowledge, and who ought to bear functional
and fiscal responsibility for implementing various aspects of a proper
scheme of lawyer accreditation. Insisting on such reasonable
arrangements as a condition of participation in the law societies'
new "approval" regime takes more courage than most law faculties
exhibited when they failed to resist the bar's recent assertion of
power.
C. LEGAL FUNDAMENTALISM

If anti-fundamentalism is under attack, the most prudent defence
might be to proffer evidence that legal rules and legal reasoning still
dominate the discourse in the classrooms of most law schools, that
the dispensing and acquisition of professional competencies remains
an important goal of most law teachers and students, and that doctrinal
scholarship continues to represent a significant proportion of the
scholarship published in our academic journals. Such evidence is not
hard to come by, but this placatory defence constitutes an implicit
repudiation of the ideals and ambitions that Canada's legal academy
has embraced for half a century or more. Valour-I contend-is the
better approach.
Even a modestly brave anti-fundamentalist might make the point
that law schools do not exist solely to train future practitioners, but
that they also have an obligation to critique the legal system, to
contribute to a general understanding of how it works and if possible,
to improve it. These important contributions require law professors
to acquire a range of legal-intellectual competencies and to develop
and disseminate a range of socio-legal analyses that differ considerably
from those associated with professional practice. Moreover, because
many law graduates do not enter private practice, but are employed
to design, implement, influence, or frustrate public policy, there is a
strong argument for ensuring that law schools properly prepare them
for their future, non-traditional legal careers. Indeed, because many
conventional practitioners also engage in similar activities-as advisors
to business, government, or social movements, or in their own right
as advocates, elected officials, or judges-there is an equally strong
argument for law schools to expose all students to these additional
perspectives.
But a truly valorous anti-fundamentalist would make quite a
different case. Legal professionals, she or he might say, know less
than they think they do about what competencies and knowledge are
actually deployed in practice today. Moreover, they know next to
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nothing about how legal practice will change over the forty or so
years during which today's law graduates will have to use what they
learn in law school. A legal education that sought only to replicate
the skill set and knowledge base of today's lawyers would therefore
look very different from the fundamentalist version mandated by the
Federation of Law Societies, and sought by many students. A legal
education that aimed to equip today's graduates for the turbulent
economy and society in which they will spend their professional
careers would look more different still.
Thus, the best, most effective, and constructive response to
fundamentalism is for legal academics to do what they do best: to
understand as completely as they can the present nature of legal
professionalism, the forces that have shaped and are inexorably
changing it, the "core knowledge" and "competencies" that will
enable law graduates to function effectively in the future, and the
intellectual perspectives that will enable society to shape law to its
needs or (depending on one's inclinations) to allow law to shape
society so as to ensure proper respect for social justice, personal
autonomy, the environment, efficient markets, or any combination
thereof, should conflict arise.
IV. CONCLUSION

Today especially, because of and in spite of the hard times, law faculties
must engage in robust dialogue with their relevant others-especially
the legal profession whose recent re-assertion of power, and turn to
fundamentalism, represent existential threats to legal education as we
have come to know it. In addition, dialogue must be equally robust
within the academy itself. The very fact that four or five decades of
progressive legal education has produced a generation of leading
lawyers who are hostile or indifferent to the institutions that educated
them must give the academy pause. So too must the continuing failure
of law faculties to convince their students that the education offered
to them is in their best interests not only as citizens but as future
lawyers. Finally, robust dialogue is necessary within the legal academy
because it is the life force of any intellectual community.
Contestation over what I have called fundamentalism should not end
with a winner and a loser. It should be ongoing or, better yet, should
evolve into a broader and deeper debate over law, the legal system
and legal professionalism. A culture in which challenge and response
are a way of life represents the most promising environment for
ensuring intellectual excellence, passionate pedagogy, and an enhanced
awareness by the academy of its responsibilities to the profession,
to the university, to its students, and to society at large. Such an
environment, as it happens, is also the best one in which to grow
future lawyers.

